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Summary. – History, not predictions of CGE models or cross-country growth 
studies, shows a strong relationship between trade and development. Vietnam’s 
experience with bilateral trade agreements, comparing actual outcomes with 
predictions from existing models, demonstrates this and the limitations of research 
methodologies. Forecasts for Vietnam greatly underestimated the impact of past 
agreements because tariff reform was not the main factor driving adjustments. 
Addressing market imperfections through institutional reform was central to 
bringing output and trade expansion. Key questions for future research are: 
whether policy reform will result in new institutional changes, and how resulting 
incentives determine the evolution of investment by sector.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between trade and development remains controversial among 
researchers in spite of political pronouncements that take this nexus as given. Pascal Lamy 
(2006), former European Union (EU) Trade Representative and now Director General of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as Robert Portman (2006) and Susan Schwab (2006), 
recent U.S Trade Representatives, have all argued that failure to conclude the Doha 
Development Agenda negotiations would be a serious lost opportunity to foster more rapid 
development in third world countries. In contrast, academic studies take both sides of this 
question, with many arguing that the evidence at hand does not support the assertions that trade 
liberalization fosters more rapid growth and development. 
Three principal analytical approaches have been utilized over the years to explore this 
relationship. Case studies under the direction of Krueger (1978) and Bhagwati (1978) for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in the late 1970s have served as the basis for 
presuming a strong link between trade and development. Cross-country regressions to establish 
the determinants of economic growth followed the pioneering work of Feder (1983) by including 
trade and policy variables as key determinants. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models 
have also been used worldwide to gauge the effects of trade reforms. The World Bank’s (2002) 
claim that developing countries stood to gain $500 billion from a successful Doha round was 
based on the predictions of their CGE model. The CGE models and econometric studies are 
attempts to establish on a more general basis the relationship between trade and growth. We 
argue in what follows that they have not provided convincing empirical evidence due to serious 
methodological limitations. Compelling up-to-date evidence can be found, however, in more 
recent cases of successful trade agreements fostering both greater trade and faster growth. Also, 
critiques of CGE and econometric growth studies speak more to the limitations of these 
methodologies than to the underlying relationship between trade and growth (e.g. Stiglitz and 
Charlton, 2005; Rodrik and Rodriguez, 1999). 
 Econometric studies (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodrik and Rodriguez, 1999; Andersen 
and Dalgaard, 2007) and reviews of this voluminous literature (Temple, 1999; Santos-Paulino, 
2005) on cross-country growth performance report conflicting results on the role of trade. Effects 
of trade variables are collinear with (some argue dominated by) macroeconomic variables and 
other globalization indicators, and tariff reductions per se are seldom found to matter. 
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Computable general equilibrium models have been used to illustrate the linkage between trade 
and development and to highlight the gains from liberalization accruing to developing countries 
in connection with WTO Doha round reforms (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe, 
2005; Hertel and Keeney, 2005). But critics of this approach use the very numbers generated in 
these papers to argue that the link between trade liberalization and development is weak 
(Tokarick, 2008; Ackerman, 2005; Polanski, 2006; Taylor and von Armin, 2007). Rodrik and 
Rodriguez (1999) further argue that tariff reductions generate only one time, long run impacts 
and not more rapid growth, and it has long been recognized that large trade impacts follow from 
“dynamic” not static reforms (Piermartini and Teh, 2005). 
Following the tradition of Krueger and Bhagwati, we utilize the case of Vietnam’s 
successful economic development, rapid expansion of trade, and history of both trade policy 
reform and institutional change to examine in detail the relationship between trade and 
development and the limitations to available research methods. Emphasis is placed on what 
actually followed bilateral trade agreements versus what was predicted by CGE models that have 
been extensively used in the Vietnamese case and elsewhere.1 We strive in this way to set the 
Vietnam case in the broader context of the trade and development literature and bring out key 
insights that go well beyond the case under study. 
WTO accession by Vietnam on 11 January 2007 as the 150th member of this organization 
culminated a long process of efforts to integrate the Vietnamese economy into international 
markets. Since 1986, when the Doi Moi restructuring process began, numerous market-oriented 
legal and economic reforms have been introduced. This process has been associated with rapid 
economic growth, increasing international trade and impressive poverty reduction. GDP per 
capita measured in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) corrected (2000) dollars increased 
almost threefold from $1,097 in 1989 to $2,739 in 2005. Over this same period trade (imports 
plus exports) increased six-fold as a share of GDP, and headcount poverty at the $1 per capita 
per day threshold had already fallen to below 15% in 1993 and was only 2% in 2002 (World 
Bank, 2006).2  
The policy dialogue by both foreigners and Vietnamese has often evaluated the ongoing 
reform process in much harsher terms than the economic performance would seem to warrant. 
Critics of Vietnamese policy continue to highlight the need for deeper institutional reform and to 
reduce persistently high tariffs for clothing and agricultural commodities (STAR-Vietnam, 2002; 
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Thanh, 2005). Much of the critique is informed simply by the economic theory underlying 
standard trade models. Paradoxically, economy wide CGE models built from this basis have not 
been very helpful to policy makers. This is so both with regard to estimated aggregate levels of 
economic variables and in the details about how growth and trade have evolved. Simulated 
changes are often small relative to both prior performance and to actual changes following 
international trade agreements. Moreover, key causal mechanisms remain to be established.  
This suggests that existing model specifications, used across the developing world at 
large, may be flawed. The models have, as we see it, overemphasized tariff changes as the 
critical element of reform and have failed to integrate satisfactorily the impact of institutional 
factors. In the case of Vietnam (and elsewhere) it is not uncommon for authors of economy wide 
impact studies to acknowledge the ongoing debate over legal reforms, the role of SOEs, access 
by foreign firms, and the importance of “services trade” – banking, insurance, financial markets, 
wholesale and retail trade, and telecommunications. However, subsequent formal modeling 
exercises have almost exclusively limited the analysis to tariff changes, probably because other 
reforms are indeed hard to capture.  
We pursue these topics by examining Vietnam’s past experience with economic 
integration as a basis for (i) understanding the general role of trade in economic development, 
and (ii) starting to predict the economic effects of WTO commitments. Our expectation, based on 
historical experience, is that these effects are likely to be much greater than available formal 
modeling exercises indicate. Important lessons of relevance to developing countries more 
generally can therefore be drawn. This includes the need for a distinctly different analytical path 
to the evaluation of trade agreement impacts than has so far been typical at both the national and 
international level. Whatever path is followed, it must better address institutional and services 
trade issues. The same goes for the key roles played by unemployment and international capital 
flows as well as productivity growth. To be sure, there exist trade agreements which have not had 
a large socio-economic impact. But our experience is that the Vietnamese success following 
bilateral agreements is rather typical of cases found across the developing world.3 
In Section 2 we provide further detail on Vietnam’s trade policy history. Section 3 
reviews existing CGE model based assessments of WTO accession and bilateral trade agreement 
impacts. This is followed in Section 4 by an identification of the key features of those models, 
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which limit their ability to predict, while Section 5 concludes and suggests directions for future 
research on the trade and development nexus.  
 
2. VIETNAM’S ECONOMIC HISTORY – POLICY AND TRADE 
The modern economic history of Vietnam is, as shown in Figure 1, remarkable. 
Following the policy reforms in 1986, GDP has grown steadily at an average rate of 7.6% per 
year. Growth accelerated to 9.8% a year from the early 1990s until 1998, but then stalled to 7.0% 
following the Asian financial crisis, before increasing again to 7.7% per year from 2002 to 2004. 
This rapid economic growth has been accompanied by an extraordinary increase in trade 
(imports plus exports as a share of GDP), from 23% in 1986 to 97% already in 1998 and 140% in 
2004. Growth in exports has been especially impressive, from only 6.6% of GDP in 1986 to 
44.8% in 1998 and 66.4% in 2004. Moreover, the share of exports in GDP has been rising 
somewhat faster than imports. In 1983 trade was more than two-thirds imports, whereas in 2004 
exports were nearly half of the trade share of GDP. Imports continue to exceed exports as capital 
flows into Vietnam, but foreign direct investment (FDI) has been erratic and was strongly 
affected by the Asian financial crisis. There was no measurable FDI in 1986. FDI grew to 7.7% 
of GDP by 1993 and stagnated at below that level, equaling 6.1% in 1998. It fell thereafter to 
less than 4% of GDP from 2002, before starting to recover after 2004. Figure 1 suggests that the 
FDI has so far had no discernable effect on past GDP growth, while the extent to which 
increasing GDP has been associated with reduced poverty is clear.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
While subject to controversy, performance is less satisfactory when it comes to 
employment expansion. According to Niimi et al. (2003) employment has only increased from 2 
to 3% since 1990. Unemployment remains at about 6.9% in urban areas and underemployment 
persists in rural areas. Nevertheless, real wages increased 36-38% over this same period, with 
minimum wage increases and higher wages paid by foreign enterprises largely accounting for 
wage growth.4  
Questions these data raise are whether trade performance has led or followed economic 
growth, and whether trade policy and specifically trade agreements have played a significant role 
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in explaining Vietnam’s development success. While short time series, serious identification 
difficulties, and likely measurement errors preclude direct econometric testing of the direction of 
these effects, we believe much can be learned from a careful look at the timing of reforms and 
corresponding bilateral trade flows.  
Figure 2 presents a timeline of significant changes in Vietnam’s trade and related 
domestic policies. The process of reforming Vietnam’s trading institutions and engaging in 
agreements with potential trade partners has been continuous if not smooth, so it is difficult to set 
precise dates of reforms that would significantly influence trade trends. Specific dates for 
changes in bilateral export flows are more evident, and two types of events are highlighted in the 
timeline – key bilateral trade agreements and ongoing trade related legal reforms.  
  
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Legal reforms have been instituted as part of the ongoing renovation process, in response 
to negotiations both of bilateral agreements and as part of the WTO accession process. The first 
significant changes at the border involved introduction of import tariffs in 1988, elimination of 
the state monopoly over international trade in 1989, and establishment of export processing 
zones in 1990. While additional reforms were undertaken in the 1990s, a substantial new impetus 
to legal reform began following the U.S. bilateral trade agreement (BTA) signed in 2000. Since 
then Vietnam has rewritten its commercial code almost entirely, with important new Enterprise, 
Competition, and Investment Laws all introduced. The final negotiations for Vietnam’s WTO 
accession were enabled by significant additional legal reforms undertaken particularly in 2005 as 
the U.S. and other WTO members insisted that Vietnam implement reforms before accession 
would be granted.5  
Turning to the key bilateral agreements,6 the first major agreement was with the EU in 
1992. Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995 (the same year that WTO accession talks formally began) 
and APEC in 1998. Implementation of tariff reductions under CEPT/AFTA began in 2001, and 
agreements under ASEAN auspices with China and Japan followed in 2002 and 2003. 
Implementation of the BTA with the U.S. got underway in 2002, and bilateral agreements on 
WTO accession were reached with WTO members, including countries with which Vietnam had 
previously negotiated bilateral trade agreements. For example, Vietnam concluded its accession 
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agreement with the EU in 2004 and all 20 bilateral accession agreements were completed by 
2006.  
It has been argued in the literature that many of the earlier bilateral agreements probably 
had little impact on Vietnam’s trade and economic performance, since they were with similar 
countries, suggesting little basis for Vietnam to realize comparative advantage. Moreover, tariff 
reductions were typically small and occurring over long, delayed implementation periods 
(Fukase and Martin, 1999a). Yet, each agreement also altered institutional arrangements between 
Vietnam and its trading partners, and data on bilateral trade flows paint an illustrative picture of 
the effectiveness of these early trade agreements.  
 Figure 3 illustrates that well before tariff reductions occurred in 2001 under 
CEPT/AFTA, trade with ASEAN partners had increased significantly. Trade with Vietnam’s 
most important ASEAN partner, Singapore actually began increasing in 1994, just prior to 
Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN. Trade with other ASEAN partners started to grow in the mid to 
late nineties, with obvious limits and erratic flows due to the Asian financial crisis. Since 1999, 
exports to Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, now Vietnam’s most important ASEAN 
export destinations, increased at least four-fold, well beyond any model predictions of exports to 
these countries. Exports to Singapore reached $1.8 billion in 2004, with exports to Thailand and 
the Philippines nearing $1 billion and to Malaysia reaching $600 million.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
  Figure 4 shows that trade between the EU and Vietnam increased rapidly from a very low 
level immediately following the 1992 bilateral agreement. Exports grew rapidly again, from $4.5 
billion in 2002 to $7 billion in 2004, at the time the U.S. BTA went into effect and WTO 
accession negotiations were completed with the EU. Vietnam exported essentially nothing to the 
U.S. until the mid 1990s and just prior to implementation of the BTA in 2002 had exported at 
most $1 billion per year. Those exports increased to over $6.5 billion in 2005. Exports to Japan 
started earlier than to most of these other destinations, and yet showed another significant 
increase following the ASEAN-Japan agreement in 2002, going from about $2.5 billion and then 
to $4 billion in 2004. Trade with China did not grow to significant levels until 2000, reaching $1 
billion, and then more than doubled to $2.5 billion in 2004.  
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[Figure 4 about here] 
 
In sum, a common result seen in these data is that as new agreements are reached, trade 
to that destination increases, often dramatically;7 and there is little evidence that export surges to 
one region diminish exports elsewhere. Region specific exports are never seen to fall, except for 
a few instances explained by economic problems of Asian partners in 1998. It is also generally 
the case that trade was initially at very low levels, and increased by orders of magnitude.  
The composition of Vietnam’s imports and exports in 2005 is shown in Table 1 to 
illustrate recent trade patterns. About a fifth of all exports are food and live animals. Petroleum 
adds 24% and labor intensive manufactured goods represent about a third of Vietnam’s exports. 
Almost 45% of those manufactured goods exports are clothing. Vietnam’s imports include 
mostly either intermediate inputs (fertilizer, plastics, leather, textiles, iron and steel, chemicals) 
or capital goods (machinery and transport equipment). Some have raised concerns as to the 
highly specialized nature of Vietnam’s exports and its dependence on only a few labor intensive 
sectors for its growth (Roland-Holst et al., 2002). Concerns have also been voiced that some 
labor intensive industries (e.g. electronics) have not grown as fast as clothing (STAR-Vietnam, 
2002). Consumer goods have been only a small part of Vietnamese imports. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 In light of the highly specialized nature of Vietnam’s exports, we look in Table 2 at 
Vietnam’s bilateral trade by commodity corresponding to the four digit SITC (Rev. 3) 
classification. For each of the key regions with whom bilateral trade agreements have been 
reached we report the extent of specialization and the number of four digit commodities traded in 
years before and after trade agreements were reached as well as in the most recent year for which 
detailed data are available (2005). In the case of exports to the EU, in 1990 prior to the bilateral 
agreement the top five commodities accounted for 57.4% of exports and the top 20 for 82.2%. 
After the agreement, in 1996 similar specialization remained in spite of an increase in trade 
levels by a factor of 24, from $74 million to $1.8 billion. But the number of four digit 
commodities exported more than doubled from 177 to 424. Exports to the EU quadrupled again 
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to $7.5 billion in 2005, and the number of four digit commodities exported increased to 640. In 
the case of exports to the U.S., prior to the BTA the top 20 commodities accounted for very high 
shares, but in 2005 the number of commodities exported had increased from 264 to 458, and 
exports had increased 8.1 times, to $7.2 billion. The U.S. has remained a relatively specialized 
destination, and the top 20 commodities accounted for 70.6% of imports in 2005. Singapore and 
China present similar stories. While substantial growth in exports following trade agreements 
(ASEAN entry) is found, the top five commodities account for around 80% of exports and the 
top 20 for about 90%, while the number of four digit commodities exported increased 
substantially.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 The data describing Vietnam’s trade and development experience tell a compelling story 
about the correlation between institutional reforms, trade performance and economic growth. 
The lessons which seem to emerge are that bilateral trade agreements in the past have generated 
new and more diversified trade flows well beyond the levels likely to follow from modest tariff 
reductions. As major new bilateral agreements were arrived at, trade flows to other destinations 
expanded as well. 8 
 WTO accession in early 2007 is the latest significant step in the process of legal and 
economic reform. In debate in Vietnam on potential WTO impacts, discussion quickly moves 
from tariff commitments to finance and insurance, telecommunications, wholesale and retail 
trade, and energy, where foreign firm operation in Vietnam rather than cross border trade is in 
focus. We keep this in mind as we move on to review existing modeling of Vietnam’s trade 
agreements.  
 
3. MODELING TRADE AGREEMENTS 
A number of modeling exercises have attempted to quantify the impacts of both bilateral 
trade agreements and Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. Rama and Sa (2005) carefully review 26 
such contributions, including a study establishing an underlying database for modeling. We 
subsequently found another four papers of relevance.9 Several of the analyses examined by Rama 
and Sa are partial equilibrium evaluations of likely WTO impacts on key sectors – rice, sugar, 
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maize, livestock, textiles, and clothing. Sixteen of the 29 impact studies, however, utilized CGE 
models and provided quantitative predictions of the economy-wide impacts of trade reform. 
 Specifications of the CGE models used to investigate trade liberalization by Vietnam 
mostly follow either the GTAP model (Hertel and Tsigas, 1997) or the World Bank’s Linkage 
model (van der Mensbrugghe, 2005). Such models capture economy-wide relationships among 
the different sectors, factor markets, households and government, allocating scarce capital and 
labor to the most productive uses as dictated by incentives influenced by tariffs. Most assume 
perfectly competitive, efficient markets, and none allowed for scale economies. Sectoral 
aggregation varied somewhat, with few studies utilizing the detail of the existing 100 plus sector 
Input-Output (IO) table (GSO, 2003), and most limited analysis to under 20 aggregate sectors. 
Minor modifications to those very similar specifications have not incorporated the recent 
additions to the Linkage model to allow dynamic simulations, focusing rather on static long run 
outcomes. The length of that long run period is not specified, an issue in evaluating results 
against actual performance. We assume that a 10 year time horizon is relevant, and the projected 
impacts are in any case a one time change, not an increase in growth rates. 
Base data for those models typically come from the official 1996 Vietnam IO table 
(GSO, 1999), with a SAM either updated using 1997 macroeconomic information as in the 
GTAP based models (Hertel, 1997), or in a few cases using more current SAMs (see Tarp et al. 
2001, 2002 and Jensen et al., 2004). Vietnam Living Standards Surveys (VLSS), done in 
1992/93 or 1997/98 are key sources of information, and base data differ little from one model to 
another. 
Following academic tradition, each study tends to focus on one aspect of the model, with 
most emphasis placed on characterizing model related policy reforms. Differences in 
assumptions on likely tariff reductions account for much of the differences found in results. 
Issues beyond tariff reduction were also addressed. For example, Ianchovichina (2003) modifies 
tariff data to account for duty drawbacks on re-exported intermediate imports. Vanzetti and 
Huong (2007) consider simulations which permit unemployment. Dee et al. (2005) includes pro-
competitive effects of service sector reform, and is the one study allowing for imperfect 
competition.10 Several studies address poverty reduction by disaggregating households, and some 
examine tax replacement strategies to cope with lost tariff revenue (Jensen and Tarp, 2005), 
which has accounted for over one-third of Vietnam’s government revenue. A few studies 
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carefully specify narrow methodological objectives (e.g. Chan at al., 2005), but most studies 
boldly assert that their results amount to a quantitative prediction of the likely impact of either 
WTO accession or earlier bilateral trade agreement adoption, and claim that they are relevant to 
the path of trade and development of Vietnam. 
 The general contention of the CGE studies is that Vietnam’s trade regime misallocates 
resources. Tariff reductions will free resources now going to protected industries, generate 
greater gains from trade and expansion of export industries, so increasing GDP. But these effects 
are typically small, especially on aggregate economic activity. Table 3 summarizes results for 30 
scenarios from seven studies which recently examined WTO accession by Vietnam. Maximum 
GDP increases were less than 3.3% until two studies after 2005 got somewhat larger impacts. 
Vanzetti and Huong (2007) realize a 15 percent increase in GDP when labor constraints are 
relaxed to account for unemployment, but their prediction is in the range of other studies when 
employment is constrained. Dimaranan et al. (2005) did realize in one scenario a 7.9% increase 
in total output, about one year’s growth. However, in scenarios which take duty drawbacks into 
account, the predicted impact is reduced by 70%. Nguyen and Ezaki (2005) argue that 
liberalization will increase household consumption and reduce poverty, but their trade WTO 
accession/multi-lateral liberalization scenarios actually show declines in GDP.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
   
 Rama and Sa (2005) observe that models may be manipulated to obtain desired results, as 
most changes are the result of exogenous assumptions of the authors. In our review we found 
GDP impacts tended to grow in later studies, supporting this concern. But impacts on long run 
GDP are in any case quite small relative to the observed average annual growth rate that would 
have increased GDP 106% over ten years. If existing CGE predictions are correct trade has 
played only a minor role in Vietnam’s growth, an implication we find implausible. 
 Trade impacts from the predictions of these models in Table 3 are somewhat larger than 
GDP impacts, with studies typically showing 10 to 20 percent increases in exports over the long 
run. Actual exports increased more than 100% from 1993 to 2002, and grew even faster 
afterwards. The one instance in which large trade growth is predicted is for the unemployment 
 12 
scenario of Vanzetti and Huong (2007). Also, later studies found somewhat larger trade impacts 
within the above range. 
 Not surprisingly, low GDP impacts make poverty predictions from trade liberalization 
inconclusive, and all studies underestimate the extent to which poverty has been falling in 
Vietnam. Even the direction of the effect of trade liberalization on poverty varied, as did the 
GDP impact direction. Authors’ predictions on poverty were conditional on their fiscal policy 
adjustments, which had at least as large an impact on GDP as did tariff reductions. Thus, losses 
from tax changes could overwhelm the gains from trade, leading to the scenarios where GDP 
falls. These results are consistent with the findings on poverty impacts of trade liberalization of 
Hertel and Winters (2005), where proper modeling of microeconomic distortions is the key to 
getting appropriate impacts on poverty, and the effects of those distortions dominate tariff 
effects. 
 Comparisons of results from studies projecting impacts of bilateral agreements to actual 
outcomes are more direct. Those agreements have been in force for several years, so relevant 
time periods exist over which observed trade and modeling results can be compared. Two studies 
done at the World Bank looked at impacts of Vietnam’s relationship with ASEAN (Fukase and 
Martin, 1999a) and at the U.S. Bilateral trade agreement (Fukase and Martin, 1999b). In the case 
of the U.S. BTA, sectoral impacts for the successful sectors are also examined. Those studies 
were done much earlier, and so anticipated lower impacts in line with typical outcomes from this 
type of study. 
In Table 4 we compare predicted changes from the study examining trade with ASEAN 
partners after 1996, when Vietnam joined ASEAN.11 Fukase and Martin (1999a) had, as alluded 
to in Section 3, anticipated little impact. In the eight years from 1996 to 2004, their prediction 
underestimated actual increases in exports from Vietnam to Indonesia by a factor of four, and to 
Malaysia and Thailand by a factor of six. In the one case where they expected a large increase, 
the Philippines, actual exports fell from 1996 to 2000 and then increased to nearly the predicted 
level by 2004. In the case of Singapore, Vietnam’s largest ASEAN partner, their export 
prediction was a 0.4% increase, yet actual exports increased over 200%.  
 
 [Table 4 about here] 
 
 13 
The Fukase and Martin (1999b) rhetoric was somewhat more optimistic in the case of the 
U.S. BTA. Their predictions included some quite large percentage changes in exports for 
products in which exports were likely to increase due to very substantial tariff reductions by the 
U.S. once Vietnam faced MFN tariffs. Table 5 shows actual 1996 sectoral exports from Vietnam 
to the U.S., Fukase and Martin’s predicted increases (in % changes) and actual changes from 
1996 to 2004. Their most notable prediction was an increase in clothing exports of 1,512%. 
Actual exports increased over eight years by 10,635%. They also predicted that textile exports 
would increase by 218%, but the actual increase was 40,804%. Results are quite similar for the 
other sectors presented in Table 5. These results vividly illustrate the problem that small initial 
shares doom model forecasts to under predict the effects of trade liberalization, even in sectors 
where tariff changes are large.12 That table shows comparable results for overall trade, where one 
would not have expected the initial condition constraint to bind so tightly. In that case, the 
prediction was that exports would increase 127.4%, but over eight years they grew 1,576%.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 have taken three different approaches to comparing CGE model results 
of trade agreement impacts against Vietnam’s actual experience. In each case the models 
seriously underestimated the observed success of the trade agreement. We therefore look 
carefully at the limitations of the underlying models in Section 4.  
 
4. MODEL LIMITATIONS 
 CGE methodology is associated with difficult modeling choices and limitations. For 
example, most models predict (only) static and long run one time reallocations of resources as 
the consequence of price adjustments following tariff changes (Rodrik and Rodriguez, 1999). 
Hence, the effects of trade agreements do not influence the path of development. While dynamic 
specifications are at the frontier of CGE modeling (e.g. van der Mensbrugghe, 2005), none of the 
studies reviewed here were dynamic, and that literature is still wrestling with short run 
macroeconomic closure issues and inability to predict the evolution of capital stock over time. 
Moreover, the underlying assumption that capital will reallocate to the sectors yielding highest 
returns, the presumption of long run static models, has not served well in predicting short to 
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medium run investment allocations (Ianchovichina et al., 2000). Clearly, models will need to do 
a better job of explaining short to medium run sectoral capacity evolution before they can 
adequately address development implications of trade liberalization. 
 In dynamic CGE models as well as in static models, macroeconomic performance, 
including economic growth, is assumed (not endogenously predicted) based on external 
forecasts. The only mechanism by which trade can affect GDP is via gains from trade generated 
by resource reallocations. Yet, the Harberger triangles of net surplus gains from tariff changes 
are typically quite small, and this is why results from CGE models of WTO trade liberalization 
impacts have generally been small (Ackerman, 2005). 
In the mid 1990s, the notion emerged that “dynamic gains” from trade liberalization were 
necessary to identify large impacts. The two key concepts put forward then were the pro-
competitive effects of trade liberalization and productivity gains resulting from greater openness 
(USITC, 1997). These changes are “dynamic” only in the sense that they go beyond tariff 
barriers, and have not fully included a growth model or explained the processes that give rise to 
productivity changes over time (Piermartini and Teh, 2005). 
Only Dee et al. (2005) examined potential pro-competitive effects of trade liberalization, 
looking at opening of service sectors to foreign firms to prevent domestic firms from exploiting 
market power. Gains are limited by the extent to which state enterprises are replaced by 
oligopolistic multinational firms, whereas efficiency gains from replacing state enterprises by 
private firms may be more significant. But modeling of these effects remains ad hoc.  
Roland-Holst et al. (2002) included productivity gains, which they attributed to 
complementary domestic policy reform, and which were essentially exogenously imposed. 
Nevertheless, the econometric literature on the relationship between trade liberalization and 
growth remains controversial. The presumption that a systematic relationship between the level 
of trade and productivity in a sector, commonly used in CGE models to capture dynamic gains, 
has yet to be conclusively supported. The broader literature shows that development and growth 
are due as much to technological progress or productivity gains resulting from other efficiency 
enhancing factors as to capital accumulation (Andersen and Dalgaard, 2006).  
 The key mechanism in existing trade models driving changes after reform is tariff 
reductions and subsequent price changes, but even setting tariff change assumptions for an 
aggregate model is problematic. One problem is that tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers 
 15 
(NTBs) must be established. Thus, modeling exercises show an increase in Vietnamese tariffs, as 
a result of tariffication of NTBs, following several reforms in the late 1990s, when trade levels 
were increasing.  
A second problem is aggregation. Negotiations involve compromises at a highly 
disaggregated level, and critical products and corresponding tariff lines in negotiations can be for 
very narrowly defined sectors. In evaluating the potential outcome from the Doha Round, the 
World Bank (Anderson and Martin, 2005) noted that exempting just 5% of tariff lines from 
reduction could eliminate potential gains from Doha Round trade liberalization. None of the 
Vietnam studies we reviewed are sufficiently disaggregated to overcome such problems. Rather, 
simplistic tariff changes, such as projecting free trade outcomes, were assumed since details of 
the outcome of WTO accession negotiations were not available at the time of writing. So, likely 
tariff changes are overestimated while the projected trade and economic outcomes are 
underestimated.  
 Some of the specific modeling choices in typical trade models have also been subject to 
considerable criticism (Ackerman, 2005; Taylor and von Arnim, 2007). This includes the 
functional form determining how tariff reductions are translated into market access 
improvements. One of the most important features is the Armington specification of international 
market share determination (see Armington, 1969). In this approach, imported intermediates (by 
source) are assumed to be separable from domestically produced intermediate inputs. That is, 
firms first decide on the sourcing of their imports. Then, based on the resulting composite import 
price, they determine the optimal mix of imported and domestic goods (Hertel, 1997). The 
specific functional forms used (i.e. the constant elasticity of substitution or CES types) have the 
virtue of allowing observed two way trade, and they constrain base solutions and simulations of 
small shocks to stay near the base case outcomes, so model results appear realistic. Yet, they are 
essentially an ad hoc feature to cope with aggregation problems that exaggerate market power in 
trade and more importantly, limit the potential for new markets to emerge.  
Historically, the values of the Armington substitution elasticities were simply assumed, 
yet these parameters are critically important in determining the magnitude and nature of changes 
that occur in CGE models. We know of no studies estimating these parameters for Vietnam. 
Furthermore, if initial international market shares are zero, the Armington functions must keep 
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shares at zero, and where shares are low initially, very large price differentials and/or substitution 
elasticities are needed to allow those sectors to grow to any appreciable size.  
To illustrate this serious model weakness we imputed the Armington elasticities of 
substitution necessary to capture the observed increases in Vietnam’s share of the U.S. market 
following the BTA for seven of the more successful commodities. This is a straightforward case 
to model – if tariffs are all that drive trade. In most cases Vietnamese exports are small relative 
to the U.S. market, with only cashew at more than 5% after the increases in trade following the 
BTA (see shares before and after the BTA in Table 6). We therefore invoke the small country 
assumption and so assume that U.S. import prices from other exporters and on average (Pus) 
remain fixed. The Vietnamese export price to the U.S. (Pvn) is then determined from the ad 
valorem tariff: 
  
 Pvn (1 + T) = Pus  so    Pvn/Pus = 1 / (1 + T) 
 
where T = To (the high tariff faced by Vietnam before the BTA) or T = Tmfn (the lower MFN 
tariff faced after the agreement). An Armington model of Vietnam’s share in the U.S. market can 
be written as: 
 
 Evn-us / Mus = c ( Pvn / Pus )
ε
   
 
where Evn-us is exports of a good to the U.S. from Vietnam, Mus is total imports of that good into 
the U.S., c is a constant and ε is the Armington elasticity of substitution to be imputed. We can 
now write the share of Vietnamese exports into the U.S. market after the BTA relative to before 
the BTA as: 
 
(Evn-us / Mus )
after BTA / (Evn-us / Mus )




We then imputed the Armington elasticities (ε) reported in Table 6 using the above formula and 
data in Table 6 on export shares and on tariffs faced by Vietnam before and after the BTA of 
each of the seven commodities. 
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 For some sectors – cashews, fish, crustaceans, and coffee – tariffs were initially very 
small, and Armington elasticities need to be over 100 for the assumed model structure to capture 
the successful increases in these sectors. For other sectors – apparel, clothing, electronics 
footwear, and furniture – tariff reductions were quite substantial yet substitution elasticities 
greater than eight and as high as 20 were needed to capture the big increases in Vietnam’s share 
of the U.S. market. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 The extremely large elasticities and very large new exports in sectors where tariffs were 
almost zero before an agreement suggest that other, institutional factors, not tariff changes, are 
what drove export success after a trade agreement. Even in cases where tariff changes are 
significant, the Armington elasticities must be quite large to explain observed trade changes. 
This highlights that movements along a restrictive demand function cannot explain the 
improvements in market access that trade agreements may bring. Accordingly, whatever 
approach is used to predict the consequences of trade agreements, it really should not rely on the 
Armington specification.  
 Labor market assumptions have also been a focus of criticism of the CGE models 
(Polanski, 2006; Stiglitz and Charlton, 2005). In the Vietnam studies, only Vanzetti and Huong 
(2007) introduce a model closure permitting unemployment. They identified only one such case, 
which they characterized as extreme. If Niimi et al. (2003) are correct that Vietnam’s recent 
economic history has shown relatively modest employment gains, the unemployment closure of 
Vanzetti and Huong (2007) may not be as extreme as they suggest. While still quite low relative 
to history, this closure finds the most reasonable trade and GDP impacts. It may also be the case 
that education levels constrain employment growth from some activities but not for others, 
suggesting that a more detailed look at labor markets is required. At a minimum, relationships 
between urban and rural labor markets and the constraints they imply for particular sectors need 
to be better understood.  
 A fundamental concern in assessing alternative future model specifications is to ask what 
constrains sectoral growth. In most CGE models, and all those examined as part of this paper, 
gains for one sector typically come at the expense of losses for other sectors as fixed capital and 
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labor endowments are reallocated. In the Vietnamese case, however, it is hard to argue that labor 
has to this point been a serious constraint on growth. The effect of FDI in augmenting capital is 
not apparent either (Figure 1), and the literature has had difficulty in attributing productivity 
gains to the presence of FDI (Javorcik, 2004; Keller, 2004). In addition, substantial domestic 
savings has led to investment equaling nearly a third of GDP. Yet, it must be the case that 
capacity constrains growth, subject to productivity enhancing effects of institutional reforms and 
to demand constraints that may be relaxed as new market access opportunities arise.   
 Institutional changes, improved market access, and domestic reform all change the 
incentives to invest in particular sectors following trade agreements. Those investments together 
with the institutional changes increase capacity and enhance productivity. A successful trade 
model would need to predict both any changes in investment patterns and productivity increases 
sector by sector as a consequence of all aspects of trade agreements. It is likely that high fixed 
(initial) costs of those investments mean that trade liberalization may facilitate the exploitation of 
significant scale economies. Sectoral estimates of likely capacity expansions provide better 
information than aggregated CGE models now do. Current models can accommodate the 
national accounting constraints within which such capital allocations occur, but they can capture 
endogenously neither the allocation of investment nor the increase in productivity that have 
apparently followed past trade agreements.  
   
5. CONCLUSION 
 This paper has focused on the relationship between trade and development, utilizing the 
case of Vietnam to compare what happens following bilateral agreements to predictions of CGE 
models. The CGE methodology is the standard approach to assessing the economic mechanisms 
by which trade fosters growth and development, and is routinely applied to analyze trade policy 
impacts both in specific developing countries and globally. There is no shortage of economy 
wide studies utilizing CGE models to examine trade policy impacts, especially in Vietnam, and 
we considered 16 such studies.  
 It emerged, as it has in recent global and regional assessments, that there is a serious 
disconnection between the small numbers from existing model predictions and the larger impacts 
anticipated and experienced from trade agreements in reality. The reasons for this are embedded 
in the fact that tariff reform and associated price changes are of much less importance than often 
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assumed. It is clear from our review that many authors are aware of the limitations of the basic 
methods applied. The rhetoric used regularly involves more optimistic conclusions. A common 
strategy has been to exogenously shift production functions outward. The claim that such shifts 
capture the link between trade and development highlights the inability of models to represent 
endogenously the mechanisms by which trade may foster development and reduce poverty. 
There is conflicting evidence on poverty reduction as well. Hertel and Winters (2005) show that 
market imperfections, such as price transmission and unemployment must be modeled to get the 
linkages between trade and poverty right. More importantly, the impact of trade liberalization 
appears small relative to the effects of revenue replacement assumptions incorporated in 
modeling of alternative tax regimes.    
 History following the implementation of past trade agreements, not model based results, 
would appear to justify the belief that WTO accession will lead to more rapid economic 
development. Our analysis of model revisions necessary to make tariff changes induce observed, 
detailed sector outcomes demonstrates that institutional changes beyond tariffs must lie behind 
the changes observed in the past. More simply, the fact that large new trade flows appear 
following bilateral agreements in sectors where tariffs were previously insignificant strongly 
suggests something else is going on. Models must cope with the prospect that new trade flows 
will arise wherever trade reforms are pursued. 
 Policy makers on the ground are already grappling with the importance of institutional 
changes. Discussions of the prospects and challenges from Vietnam’s WTO accession invariably 
move towards discussion of services trade, legal reform, and the role of the state in the economy. 
But it is difficult to foresee quantitatively the impacts of reforms from those discussions. In the 
sector studies we reviewed as background, authors tended to shy away from quantitative 
conclusions. Instead, recommendations for further institutional reforms are emphasized, while 
offering a simple indication of the anticipated direction of changes in competitive advantage. 
Progress on how institutional reforms may be captured in research methodologies, in Vietnam 
and elsewhere, is critical to improving predictions from methods we rely on, and in establishing 
the mechanisms by which trade reforms may impact development. 
 The key puzzle, in looking ahead, for all those engaged in ongoing, policy relevant trade 
analysis (including academic researchers and development practitioners more broadly) is to 
identify the mechanisms through which trade influences development and so determine what 
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limits the expansion of trade and growth, in particular sectors and overall. Our observations are 
clearly consistent with the trend toward developing dynamic versions of economy wide models 
(van der Mensbrugghe, 2005; Ianchovichina et al., 2000). Dynamic development questions have 
to be captured in short to medium run models to be of interest in this endeavor. Rapid growth 
and the limited employment generation of the Vietnam experience highlight the limitations of 
analysis based on traditional clearing of aggregated factor markets. Under and unemployment of 
labor are clearly important, and relaxation of demand constraints are evident in the Vietnam case 
in the form of reemergence of textile quotas on Vietnam from the U.S. Model closures must 
address both demand constraints (market access) and under employment to get trade impacts 
right. 
An important key to understanding the link between trade and development is to better 
capture the role of trade incentives on investment. Any path forward to quantitatively assessing 
the potential impacts of trade agreements will evidently need to respect the fundamental national 
accounting identities of the social accounting matrices (SAMs) that are the foundation of model 
based approaches to quantitative trade reform assessment. These incorporate the basic supply-
demand balances and macroeconomic consistency that must hold. We find that the key 
behavioral relationships which are in need of explanation in future research include:  
 Uncovering the factors that determine the evolution of the capital stock, hence capacity, 
by sector;  
 Establishing how productivity by sector evolves in response to trade incentives and 
institutional reforms; and  
 Determining how factors outside the country under study shape developments in market 
access (demand).  
In conclusion, Vietnam is an important case illustrating successful economic development 
and poverty alleviation from a low income level. The extensive involvement of the state in the 
Vietnamese economy may make it a special case in some respects. Yet, the institutional reforms 
undertaken (particularly in preparation to join the WTO and as a consequence of past bilateral 
agreements) are commonly found in other developing countries. We believe our critical look at 
the lessons from Vietnam have broad application in terms of the methodology employed to 
examine trade liberalization as well as in assessing the linkages between international trade 





1 Focus is on the CGE methodology in this paper because cross-country regressions necessitate examination of 
multiple countries. This paper was motivated by setting the lessons learned from the Vietnamese case in the broader 
context of the trade and development literature and shedding new light on issues that go beyond the case under 
study. Moreover, if growth regressions do show that trade matters, they beg the question “why?” CGE models 
attempt to elaborate some of the mechanisms by which trade impacts growth. 
 
2 Vietnam’s own poverty criterion set the poverty rate at 58% in 1993 and slightly below 29% in 2002, with a food 
poverty measure of 24% in 1993 and 11% in 2002 (Thang, 2004). 
 
3 A reviewer raised the concern that Vietnam’s experience following its bilateral agreements may be unique, or 
peculiar to East Asia. In our experience, however, substantial increases in trade flows between partners signing 
bilateral agreements are commonplace and have generally been under-predicted, with some notable exceptions, 
particularly in Africa and when there is civil strife. 
  
4 The nationally representative household surveys (known by the acronym VLSS and more recently VHLSS) 
suggest somewhat lower unemployment rates. Nevertheless, we believe that both under and unemployment are 
concerns that must be addressed in any assessment of economic impacts in Vietnam.  
 
5 The channels through which legal changes work include that they (i) make contracting and so cross border 
economic relationships more reliable, facilitating trade and investment relationships, (ii) influence uncertainty under 
which firms operate, and (iii) improve the environment for investment, for both foreign-invested and Vietnamese 
firms. We have not attempted to address in this paper the problem of quantifying trade impacts of broad legal 
changes, but highlight that changes in trade coincide directly with these institutional reforms. Existing models which 
we review in Section 3 rely on behavioral relationships which preserve the status quo, whereas legal changes would 
alter many of the underlying economic structures and behaviors.  
 
6 Niimi et al. (2003) note that by 2000 Vietnam had negotiated 57 bilateral trade agreements and 72 MFN tariff 
agreements. See also Thang (2004). 
 
7 Econometric evidence on trade flow impacts of bilateral agreements is problematic with the short time series data 
available. It is not possible to establish causality for a one time shock. We did compute t-statistics to see if trend 
trade flows to a particular partner accelerated in a statistically significant manner immediately after bilateral 
agreement with that partner. For the US BTA, the two EU agreements and other major bilateral agreements the 
increase in trend was significant at better than 1%. The only minor exception was for some of the smaller ASEAN 
partners due to erratic trade flows following the Asian crisis, which raised standard errors so significance could not 
be shown. 
 
8 Hummels and Klenow (2005) provide evidence consistent with ours that trade liberalization brings product 
diversification. 
 
9 See Abbott et al. (2006) and references therein. 
 
10 Specifically, they introduce an oligopolistic mark-up and assume that the mark-ups fall by an arbitrary amount as 
trade liberalization brings competition. On the basis of this exercise they conclude that impacts of tariff reforms 
negotiated in the WTO accession agreement would be trivial in comparison to recent economic performance. 
 
11 1996 is the base year in both studies by Fukase and Martin (1999a; 1999b), so we compare actual outcomes from 
that base year. ASEAN partnerships began in 1996, and U.S. trade started to expand in 1996 as well, but the real 
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Figure 1. Economic Growth, Trade, FDI, and Poverty in Vietnam
GDP Trade FDI (* 10)
 30 
1986 Doi Moi  (the Renovation)  -- Economic reforms begin
1987
1988 Import tariffs introduced
1989 Market oriented reforms, Unified exchange rate
State monopoly of foreign trade  eliminated
1990 Export Processing zones established
1991 Law on Import and Export Duties  - established Preferential tariffs
1992 European Union trade agreement 
1993
1994 Quotas introduced
1995 WTO Accession Working Party  established
Joined ASEAN
1996
1997 Asian Financial Crisis begins
Reduced requirements on firms to enter foreign trade
1998 Joined APEC  (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation)
1999 MFN agreement with Japan
2000 US -Vietman Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA ) signed
2001 CEPT/AFTA  implementation plan under ASEAN begins
New Trade Policy Roadmap - most QRs removed
2002 ASEAN China  Free trade area
Implementation of US-BTA  begins
2003 ASEAN Japan  Comprehensive economic partnership
TRQs introduced
2004 EU -Vietnam bilateral agreement on WTO Accession
Competition Law
2005 29 new or amended Laws on Commerce and Trade 
2006 Final bilateral agreements for WTO Accession  reached
CEPT/AFTA under ASEAN implementation to be completed
Source: Adapted mostly from Thanh (2005) and www.WTO.org



























Figure 3. Vietnamese Exports to ASEAN countries

























Figure 4. Value of Total Vietnamese Exports to Various Trading Partners




  Misc manufactured articles 10,403   Manufactured goods 10,119
Clothing and Accessories 4,681 Textile yarn, Fabric etc. 3,435
Footwear 3,079 Iron and Steel 3,207
Furniture, Bedding etc. 1,401 Non-ferrous metals 837
Leather, Leather goods 710
  Fuels, Lubricants etc. 8,358
Petroleum, Petroleum products 7,686   Machines, Transport Equipment 9,218
Electr. and mech. apparatus, Parts nes 1,966
  Food and Live Animals 6,333 Specialized industrial machinery 1,632
Fish, Crustaceans, Mollusks 2,743 Road vehicles 1,449
Cereals, Cereal preparations 1,468 General industrial machinery nes 1,334
Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Spices 1,026 Telecommunication, sound equipment etc. 876
Vegetables and Fruit 818
  Chemicals, Related Products nes 5,290
Plastics in primary form 1,517
Chemical materials, nes 691
Medicinal, Pharmaceutical products 649
Fertilizer except GRP272 649
Other Exports 7,353 Other Imports 12,134
Total Exports 32,447 Total Imports 36,761
Source: UN Comtrade (2007)
Note : Commodities classified according to SITC Rev. 3, at the 2 digit level
Table 1. Key Vietnamese Imports and Exports in 2005, $U.S. million
Leading Exports Leading Imports
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  EU - 15 $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 42.5 57.4 845.7 47.4 3458.8 46.4
         20 commodities 60.8 82.2 1442.5 80.9 5363.9 71.9
  Total 74.0 1783.6 7460.2
  No. of 4 Digit SITC Commodities 177 424 640
  US $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 262.3 76.8 523.0 59.1 2686.7 37.3
         20 commodities 323.3 94.6 798.0 90.1 5088.8 70.6
  Total 341.7 885.2 7205.5
  No. of 4 Digit SITC Commodities 187 264 458
  Singapore $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 95.2 73.6 644.4 78.7 1548.5 85.4
         20 commodities 120.5 93.2 715.4 87.4 1642.7 90.6
  Total 129.3 818.9 1813.0
  No. of 4 Digit SITC Commodities 173 445 551
  China $US million % $US million % $US million %
  Top 5 commodities 9.8 90.7 814.1 87.8 1868.0 73.2
         20 commodities 10.8 100.0 877.0 94.6 2293.3 89.9
  Total 10.8 926.7 2550.5
  No. of 4 Digit SITC Commodities 23 270 378
Source : UN Comtrade (2007)
Note : Years were chosen for each region or country to bracket the years in which trade agreements were 
negotiated in order to assess the impact of agreements on specialization and diversification. For example,
the EU signed agreements with Vietnam in 1992 and 2004.
1992 2000 2005









Table 3. Predictions Based on 30 Scenarios of CGE Studies of the Impact of WTO Accession on Vietnam, 
Percentage Changes 
Study Number of 
scenarios 
GDP Export Import 
  min max min max min max 
Fukase and 
Martin (1999a)a 
5 -4.7 1.0 3.9 15.2 3.1 12.8 
CIE (2002)b 7 0.2 3.3 0.6 12.1 N/A N/A 
Dee et al. (2005) 4 0.03 2.4 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Toan (2005) a, c 1       fall       0.13       0.4 
Nguyen and Ezaki 
(2005) 
5 -0.06 -0.7 1.7 18.2 3.2 15.4 
Dimaranan et al. 
(2005)a 
2 6.7 7.9 15.2 18.8 N/A N/A 
Vanzetti and 
Huong (2007) 
6 1 15 -2 57 -1 37 
Source: Abbott et al. (2006) 
Notes:  
a) Only the sector-disaggregated predicted effects on output were reported in the paper. The numbers reported here 
are calculated averages of the predicted effects on output, not GDP. 
b) The effects on GDP and exports were not reported in scenarios (ii) and (iii). 
c) The paper by Toan (2005) only has one scenario. 






1996 changes 1996-2000 1996-2004 2000-2004
$US million % % % %
  Indonesia 204.4 25 48.1 103.5 37.1
  Malaysia 150.4 59 202.9 285.7 27.3
  Philippines 196.9 226 -11.0 124.0 151.7
  Singapore 436.0 0.4 87.8 218.9 69.8
  Thailand 65.7 98 403.5 568.4 32.7
Source: Predictions are from Fukase and Martin (1999a)
Table 4. Model Predictions Versus Actual Exports to ASEAN Partners after 1996






Table 5. Model Predictions versus Actual Exports to the U.S. Following the BTA Implemented in 2002
Actual value   Predicted Actual changes
1996 change 1996-2000 1996-2004 2000-2004
$US million % % % %
Agriculture and Forestry 56.1 -1 575 1,383 120
Basic Manufacturing 1.6 329 826 5,596 515
Beverages and Tobacco 0.6 125 13 317 270
Clothing 25.7 1,512 106 10,635 5,113
Coal, Oil, Gas 0.01 4 -49 1,424 2,888
Chemical, Rubber, Plastic 1.5 64 400 2,140 348
Electronics & Machinery 0.4 284 737 29,865 3,478
Processed Agriculture 119.5 19 28 44 13
Petroleum & Coal 85.8 N/A 11 340 298
Textiles 0.2 241 718 40,804 4,902
Transport Equipment 0.02 N/A 559 63,877 9,613
Light Manufacturing 45.1 147 263 2,601 643
  Furniture & Footwear 42.8 233 2,182 584
   Other Light Manufacturing 2.3 811 10,255 1,037
Total 341.7 127 159 1,576 547




  Imputed 
Armington 
2000 2004 2000 2004 Elasticity
% % % %
  Cashews 11.5 30.4 0.9 0.0 -114
  Apparel and Clothing 0.1 3.8 38.7 15.4 -20
  Electronics 0.002 0.02 28.7 2.0 -11
  Fish, Crustaceans 3.0 5.1 0.5 0.3 -375
  Footware 1.0 2.9 26.3 10.6 -8
  Furniture 0.07 1.53 26.2 0.02 -13
  Coffee 4.6 5.5 0.008 0.005 -5,468
Vietnam's Share of U.S. 
Market 
Table 6. Tariff Changes and Imputed Armington Elastiticies: Selected Commodities Following the U.S. BTA
  Tariff paid 
 
Source: UN Comtrade (2007) and authors’ calculations 
 
 
